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Industrial Unrest in Canada :
A Diagnosis of Récent Expérience
John H.G. Crispo and
H.W. Àrrhurs
To diagnose the récent wave of industrial unrest in
Canada, it is first of ail necessary to indentify its characteristics. The two major dimensions of this phenomenon
concern the source of union mïlitancy and its illégal manifestations.
Relations between labour and management in Canada hâve been
unusually turbulent over the past few years. In an attempt to identify
the source of this turbulence, and to assess its implications, we hâve
endeavoured to utilize the dual perspectives of our two disciplines, law
and industrial relations. While the exercise has proven highly selfeducative, we are obliged to admit that it has not produced définitive
data or cast-iron conclusions.x
A Perspective on Industrial Unrest in Canada
I CRISPO, JOHN H.G., Director, Center I
Labour-management
contact I for Industrial Relations, University of I
seems to b e t h e unavoidable byToronto, Toronto.
product of industrialization in a I ARTHURS, H.W., Osgoode Hall Law I
free sociery. C a n a d a , as might b e | School, York University, Toronto.
|
( 1 ) The reader should be forewarned about the « method of research » which
underlies much of the material presented in this paper. It began with a number
of informai discussions with trade union leaders over two years ago. Thèse discussions gave rise to the original outline of the paper : an outline which was used as
the basis for an oral présentation on numerous occasions before a variety of union,
management and government groups. On most of thèse occasions, a good deal of
reaction was engendered. This reaction resulted in the addition of many more
points to the outline and in the modification of some of those already incorporated
into it. This process was supplemented by our practical and académie expérience
in related work over the past several years and by extensive reading around the
subject. We might dignify our basic approach by terming it « action research » but
some would even take offence at that. Unorthodox at best, our methodology is
doubtless subject to serious réservations. This weakness was noted by those who
reviewed the first draft of this paper. We are indebted to the following individuals
for this observation and for many other helpful comments : Dean A.W.R. Carrothers,
Dr. AJ. Craig, Professor A. Kruger, Dr. George Saunders, and Professor S.A. Schiff.
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expected, has had its share of industrial unrest, the most obvious manifestations of which, at least recently, hâve coincided with period of économie
prosperity. This is not to suggest that such strife is absent during
économie downturns, but rather that it then tends to be muted and
perhaps less intensive. This is to be expected in view of the effect of
unemployment on union bargaining power and of the effect of reduced
profits on managements negotiating position. During the late 50's and
early 60's, for example, much of the conflict which took place was
engendered by managements détermination to withstand further union
demands and to retrieve concessions made in the earlier postwar years.
Laboura progress was not entirely halted during this period of économie
recession, but it was unable to sustain the record of victories which it
had enjoyed for most of the postwar period.
It could be argued that the rising industrial unrest we experienced
thereafter, at least for the early years of the 60's, was attributable to a
release of pent-up frustrations over relative union ineffectiveness which
accumulated during the late 50's. While this may be true in part, as a
total explanation it reflects an oversimplified view that labour-management strife ebbs and flows in response to the phases of the business
cycle. This school of thought we will return to shortly, but first we
wish to focus attention on the two features of the présent wave of unrest
which suggest that its causes are much more complex.
To begin with, much of this unrest is characterized by militancy
that is less the product of labour leadership than the spontaneous
outbreak of rank and file restlessness. As one commentator recently
noted, « Instead of having to whip their members into a mood militant
enough to justify their call for a walkout, the union executives hâve
given the impression of running behind the membership. » In some
case the rank and file seem to hâve been rebelling as much against the
«union establishment » as against the «business establishment».
Indeed, privately, union officiais hâve been known to term some récent
rank and file behaviour « mob rule », « the tyranny of the mernbership »,
and even worse. And yet, as we will suggest, we may be witnessing
nothing more sinister than a healthy sign of renewed trade union vitality.
But however characterized, this shift in the source of union militancy
adds a new dimension to the industrial relations scène.
The second feature which is worthy of note is the increased lengths
to which the labour movement appears willing to go in défiance of law
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and order. An unusual incidence of illégal strikes and défiance of
court orders has been a distinctive characteristic of the latest wave of
labour-management conflict. It would be naive to suggest that law and
order will ever command the undivided respect of labour and management, if only because historically the trade union movement feels that
it could not hâve secured many of its présent rights without deliberately
defying légal restraints placed upon it. Accepting the fact, however,
that disrespect for law is to some extent endémie in labour relations,
(he présent situation seems to hâve brought the underlying tendency
to lawlessness to the surface.
We do, finally, wish to avoid the impression of undue pessimism.
It is important to place thèse two characteristics of the current industrial
relations scène in proper perspective. While rank and file militancy
and lawlessness hâve appeared of la te in an unusually potent combination, some weight must be given to the view that our présent difficulties may be simply paît of the price of prosperity. Yet even to say
this is to say something quite disturbing, for it suggests that a free
society cannot maintain a period of sustained économie advance without
engendering serious industrial unrest. To the extent that this unrest
can only be relieved by round after round of generous settlements, the
problem of maintaining price stability during a period of full employment can be aggravated. Thus it can be made increasingly difficult to
achieve thèse two goals, let alone our other économie objectives, at
one and the same time.
Of Trade Unionism, Collective Bargaining,
Labour Law and Lawyers

It is appropriate at this stage to outline some of the pre-conceived
notions we bring to bear to our subjeot. In the first place we should
make clear our views on the rôle of trade unionism and collective bargaining. Quite frankly, our value judgments are basically those which
are reflected in our présent industrial relations System. Though collective bargaining may sometimes appear to resuit in a desperate and
never-ending succession of crises, it is an essential part of industrial
organization in a free society. This in turn leads us to accept trade
unionism since it is an indispensable participant in the collective
bargaining process.
Sometimes the labour movement is perceived almost exclusively in
terms of its économie rôle, yet its most critical contribution may weîl
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lie in other sphères. For example, by its législative eampaigns foisocial reform, and by private experiments in social security mstituted
through collective bargaining, the labour movement, pressing from the
left, acts as one of the many competing interest groups in our pluralistic
society. In this sensé trade unionism acts as a countervailing power
in the political as well as in the économie sphère.
We do not mean to minimize the rôle of trade unionism in our
collective bargaining process. In this process unions are often viewed
as « slot machines », disgorging économie benefits to those who invest
their dues. No less importantly, they act as advocates of démocratie
values in industry, thereby contributing to the dignity and self respect
of the worker. Above ail, in both respects, unions through their leaders
hâve traditionally functioned as « managers of discontent ». Collective
bargaining dépends on worker discontent as its motive power and utilizes
the strike as a catalytic safety valve. Normally, union leaders do not
hâve to seek out worker discontent: employers can usually be counted
on to supply it. Sometimes, union leaders, as good entrepreneurs, become aware of the need to exploit new markets and attract new clientèle,
and manufacture discontent. But there are times — this would seem
to be one — when unions and their leaders appear to be overwhelmed
by unsolicited opportunities for business.
Given the fact that we accept collective bargaining and trade
unionism as legitimate, even vital instruments in our society, what of
our analysis of the légal framework within which they function ? We
see law as a technique of securing orderly compliance with society's
objectives and standards of behaviour. In a totalitarian society, of
course, law may represent the imposed will of a ruling class; in a democracy it approximates the social consensus. The first point to be made
about the rôle of law in industrial relations, then, is that it is neither
static nor inévitable. As society's view of désirable industrial relations
policies changes, society has it within its power to change the law. If
there is a gap between prevailing social attitudes and the law, there is
no intrinsic reason why it cannot be narrowed. To be sure., the law
does acquire a vitality of its own, and légal institutions hâve the same
perverse instinct for survival as other potentially obsolescent institutions.
But it is unrealistic to either praise or condemn « the law » as a thing
apart from the social policy which it embodies.
A basic thème of our contemporary policy, as we hâve noted, is
the desirability of collective bargaining as a technique of regulating
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industrial relations, and the legitimacy of the strike as an adjunct of
the bargaining process. Our labour relations acts advance this policy
by attempting to ensure the confrontation of reasonably equal labour
and management power blocs. The right of workers to organize unions
and to participate in their activities is proclaimed by law; employers
arc obliged to bargain in good faith with unions; upon the breakdown
of negotiations, strikes are permitted and strikers are given certain
limited immunities from reprisai. On the other side, unions also are
obliged to bargain in good faith, to refrain from striking except in support
of collective bargaining demands, and to refrain from various forms of
harassment for the duration of a collective agreement. Civil, criminal
and administrative remédies are available to force employers and unions
to conduct collective bargaining and économie warfare according to
thèse rules which are enshrined in our labour relations acts.
The éducative function of législation must be emphasized hère,
perhaps even more than its coercive impact. The very announcement
of public policy by legislators leads the great majority of citizens —
vvorkers and employers — to give at least grudging allegiance to the
statute. Where pockets of résistance remain, techniques of persuasion
are mobilized to secure voluntary compliance. Conciliators may act
as catalysts to good faith bargaining; field officers may be sent out by
labour boards to persuade the parties to abandon unfair labour practices;
the boards themselves may issue non-punitive déclarations to encourage
transgressors to cease illégal strikes. Even the sanctions available to
the boards and to the courts hâve their greatest impact when they are
used in terrorem to secure an end to illegality, rather than to punish it
after-the-fact. Only in a tiny fraction of cases are criminal penalties
actually invoked.
However, the law is not monolithic. While the labour relations acts
proclaim a contemporary policy which represents a substantial social
consensus, the common law jurisprudence of labour relations represents
an older social consensus, based upon différent views of public policy
and of the propriety of collective bargaining. The roots of the common
law doctrines which are used to regulate picketing, boycotts and other
labour activities, reach back about a century to a time when labour
organization was characterized as a threat to industrial progress. The
very act of combination, by employées at least, was considered a civil
wrong, and activities such as picketing designed to bring économie
pressure to bear upon the employer were likewise treated as torts. Today
thèse précédants are still applied by the courts.
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Thus, to speak of the rôle of « law » is something less than accurate.
There are diverse, indeed conflicting, strains within the law. The older
policy favous protection of entrepreneurial activity against union interférence, and the newer policy favours protection of collective bargaining
against employer hostility. As well, even within each of thèse policies
there is an internai paradox. In each, the law strikes a délicate balance
between freedom and order. Common law doctrines place a very high
premium on order and restrict the freedom of employées to associate,
assemble, and make public appeals in support of their économie objectives. Thus, « order » in this context means the order of the private
employment contract whose terms are highly favourable to the party
with superior bargaining power, normally the employer. The labour
relations acts, in turn, severely inhibit the freedom of an employer to
use this superior power to discourage unionization by threats, lockouts
or dismissals. This restriction of the employées freedom is undertaken,
again, in the name of order, but in this context, « order » means the
resolution of économie disputes by a process of collective bargaining.
Clearly, this kind of « order » may resuit in an imbalance of power in
favour of one party or the other.
Since collective bargaining statutes accept as legitimate occasional
« disorders » of the very types the common law condemns, and since the
quality of the bargain struck under the two Systems is likely to be very
différent, labour and management hâve each to some extent acquired
a vested interest in preserving and expanding that part of the légal
System which reinforces their power position. Labour relations law,
then, has become as much a tool of contending groups as an expression
of social consensus.
Given this somewhat obscure and self-contradictory légal régime,
it is not surprising that debate over future légal developments should
be represented by two polar positions. At the one extrême it could be
argued that the law should abstain totally from intervention in industrial
relations; at the other extrême, there is the possibility of an all-embracing
code which would regulate every significant feature of labour-management relations through légal institutions. It is, perhaps, significant
that few lawyers professionally active in labour relations work are to
be found in support of either position.
This brings us, finally, to a brief considération of the current rôle
of the lawyer in industrial relations. Clearly he is more than a profes-
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sional génie whose awsome skill is placed at the service of whoever rubs
the légal bottle. It is true that many lawyers hâve contributed to the
exacerbation of labour-management tensions by violent partisanship;
their capacity for mischief is part of the folklore of labour relations.
Since lawyers are skilled in the use of légal techniques, they frequently
win critical battles before boards and courts, and leave behind a residue
of resentment. This resentment is directed not only at the law, but at
those who administer it — judges, board members, and lawyers. But
lawyers can, and increasingly do, operate in a constructive and créative
way. Through skill at negotiation, ability to résolve conflict by eonstiucting compromises, and instinct for reasoned, rather than arbitrary,
solutions, lawyers can contribute much to good labour relations. The
experienced lawyer, particularly, becomes at once tactician and moral
tutor for his client. He is thus strategically located, if he understands
the problems, to minimize the antagonisms between labour and management, while serving the long-run best interests of his client.
Against this view of the background of the System, its rules, assumptions, and principal participants, we proceed to an examination of the
présent situation.
Signs of the Récent* Wave of Industrial Unrest

To diagnose the récent wave of industrial unrest in Canada, it is
first of ail necessary to identify its characteristics more fulîy than we
hâve thus far done. As already indicated, the two major dimensions of
the phenomenon concern the source of union militancy and its illégal
manifestations. In addition, there are at least six spécifie features of
unrest that can be distinguished.
THE UNSEATING OF LONG-TIME UNION LEADERS

One of the most significant signs of rank and file restiveness and
industrial unrest in gênerai is to be found in the turnover of senior
union officers, particularly in some of the major international unions.
Normally it is extremely difficult to oust the administration of a major
labour organization, even when the opposition is itself reasonably highly
placed within the union. Almost inevitably any radical change must be
the product of a strong undercurrent of discontent among the members
at large. Récent élections in such unions as the United Steelworkers of
America and the International Union of Electrical Workers indicate
how deeply this undercurrent has run of late in some unions.
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Admittedly thèse two examples involve international unions anJ
thus hardly provide compelling proof of tbe attitudes of Canadian union
raembers. While there has been significant turnover among local union
leaders in Canada, there is no évidence to indicate that its volume is
greater than it has been in the past. Several outstanding cases, among
postal employées, railway workers, and steelworkers, reveal what can
happen hère when the rank and file becomes disenchanted, but thèse
may not be indicative of any major trends. More senior union officers
might be unseated in Canada were it not for the fact that the Canadian
membership in many international unions does not hâve direct control
over its own top officers, who are elected as part of a slate at an international convention. This is particularly true among the railway and
the building trades unions, where there has been a long-standing reluctance to allow the Canadian membership to elect its own représentatives.
Yet even in the absence of additional data, discussions with union
leaders and members, and with industrial relations observers, persuade
us that union leadership on both sides of the border is being challenged
more regularly and more effectively today than has been the case for
years.
T H E FAILURE TO RATIFY COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

Perhaps even more noteworthy than the previous feature is the
refusai of union members to ratify collective agreements negotiated by
their officers. Except where this can be shown to be a deliberate union
strategem, such refusais are évidence of the waning power of the union
hierarchy whose prestige and authority are undermined by répudiation
of their negotiating « successes ». While no figures are available on
this phenomenon in Canada, it is striking to note that ratification votes
were unsuccessful in roughly 10°/o of the case which were handled by
the Fédéral Médiation and Conciliation Services in the United States
between mid 1965 and mid 1966. More recently that figure has risen
to over 15%. Although the proportion of rejections is undoubtedly lower
in Canada, membership refusai to ratify agreements has been a central
problem in several major cases, including most notably those in the
steel, packinghouse and transportation industries.
WILDCAT STRIKES

A third sign of unrest has taken the form of « wildcat » strikes which
are neither called nor condoned by responsible union officers. To be
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sure, unions hâve sometimes given clandestine support to so-called
wildcat strikes in order to harrass management as part of their bargaining tactics. But the wildcat strikes to which we refer are authentic,
spontaneous, rank and file uprisings. They are essentially protest
démonstrations against the authority of both employer and union. Important examples of such strikes hâve occurred in the railway, primary
steel and mining industries.
INTER-UNION RAIDTNG AND BREAKAWAY MOVEMENTS

As might be expected from thèse signs of self-assertion by the
membership, traditional organizational loyalties are weakening and
disappearing. This is reflected in a rising tendency, more prévalent in
Canada than in the U.S., to exchange one union for another, through
individual or en bloc défections. This lias been especially obvious in
the Province of Québec, where for some years now the Confédération
of National Trade Unions has provided national and international union
members with a viable alternative.
Where no such obvious option has been available, local groups of
disgruntled workers hâve sometimes chosen to go their own way. Across
the country from Vancouver to St. John's, amongst ail sorts of workers,
one finds scattered breakaway and unaffiliated groups. Even within
that portion of the labour movement which is affiliated to the Canadian
Labour Congress, there is more of a tendency than in the récent past
for workers to change unions when they think their position will be
improved by so doing.
In gênerai, the point is that workers are no longer content to suffer
apathetically an inferior calibre of trade union représentation. Instead
they show relatively little hésitation in shifting their loyalty to a new
bargaining agent which seems to promise more effective prosecution of
their interests.
UNION BREAKTHROUGHS IN N E W SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY

Just as workers with a history of unionization hâve shown more
inclination to transfer their loyalties from one union to another, so too
hâve formerly uninterested workers begun to exhibit their disquiet by
unionizing for the first time. The new enthusiasm for organization
among public servants and professional employées is in marked contrast
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to the cool response unions received in thèse sectors of the (Xîonomy
only a few years ago. Thèse workers suddenly seem to be deciding
that they hâve many grievances in common with their unionized counterparts in other sectors of the economy. They appear to be determined
to make up ovemight for any legacy of disadvantage inherited from
their unorganized past.
LOST T I M E DUE TO STRIKES

Lost time due to strikes is the one quantitative measure of labour
unrest. In 1966 this loss in Canada amounted to over five million man
days. In absolute terms, this topped the postwar peak of 4,500,000
man-days lost in strikes in 1946, but relative to the size of the workforce,
it fell significantly short of that record year. More noteworthy from
a current point of view is the fact that lost time due to strikes lias, with
the exception of one year, been rising throughout this décade, While
1966 may turn out to be a peak year for the 1960's, and while the time
lost may décline somewhat in this and subséquent years, this fact does
not diminish the significance of the trend to the end of 1966.
Diagnosing the Current Wave of Industriel! Unrest
Acknowledging the risks of generalization, especially when based
upon fragmentary and impressionistic évidence, we now a/ttempt a
diagnosis. As académies, no doubt we should prefer the security that
attaches to the analysis of contemporary events which hâve already
become history. As innocents abroad in the real world of industrial
conflict, we cannot resist spéculation — no matter how naive, how
presumptuous it may seem. View us, if you will, as a pair of intellectual
Luddites whose disdain for the computer has led us to this last ignominious public display of the décline of the académie artisan.
We will focus on the two most prominent manifestations of the
current situation which we outlined earlier. First we will examine the
causes of rank and file militancy and then we will turn to the causes of
labour défiance of law and order. To begin, however, there is an important background considération which we feel is of great significance.
A BACKGROUND FACTOR

Labour militancy in North America can be viewed as part of the
pervasive restlessness of this century. In science and art, as in politics
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and philosophy, this is an âge of new truths. As empires and idéologies
across the world explode and coalesce, and as mass média give the
average worker some sensé of involvement in thèse momentous events,
it is almost inévitable that the excitement of the times will permeate
every aspect of our lives — including industrial relations. Trade
imionists, like so many in our society, seem less disposed today to accept
the status quo. Along with others, they appear to share the view that
things need not — indeed, should not — remain as they are for very
long. Unlike some among the impatient, however, trade unionists are
prepared to resort to concerted action to bring about desired changes.
In this respect the labour movement resembles other broadly based
reform movements in the world at large. Thus, there is a tendency
among active trade unionists to identify their struggles with those of
former colonial countries and the disenfranchised negro. Probably more
noteworthy is the average worker's vague and inarticulate feeling of
restlessness. The net effect of ail of thèse forces may be to turn lack
of respect for leaders and authority of any kind into an ingrained
characteristic of our time.
Given this gênerai considération, why rank and file militancy?

EXPLAINING RANK AND FILE MILITANCY

In suggesting answer to the question « why rank and file militancy' ? », we do not intend to suggest any particular order of priority.
Rather, our enumeration of factors is based on a logical framework for
présentation instead of any relative ranking which we would attach to
them.
The Pervasiveness of the Demand for More in
Our Affluent Society
It is now so widely recognized that we live in an economy of rising
expectations that it seems almost trite to mention it. Yet, only this
characteristic of our time explains the increasingly apparent paradox
that the more people get the more they want. Potentially even more
troublesome are the demands which people accumulate when they do
not get as much « more » as they expect for a period of time. As noted
earlier, this may hâve been the case during the recession years of the
late 1950's and early 1960's.
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To be sure, should we ever flag in our quest for more, marketing
and advertising experts revive our jaded appetites. Thus, society has
institutionalized the business of creating discontent, by developing a
whole new profession whose members miglit best be described as « merchants of discontent ». Of course, it would be naive to suggest that
our acquisitive instincts would disappear if we were not constantly
bombarded by hidden and not-so-hidden persuaders. We merely
point out that middle class mores hâve been accepted by the organized
worker in his capacity as a consumer, and that consequently middle
class purchasing power is his immédiate objective in collective bargaining. On this phenomenon we make no moral judgment, but we
do observe that advertisers may be able to merchandize discontent more
effectively than unions and their leaders can manage it or employers
satisfy it.
Inflation and the Rising Cost of Living
Very much related to the first point is the rôle of inflation, regardless of its cause. Once the cost of living starts to rise, the scramble for
more intensifies since it then takes more in money terms just to hold
one's own in real terms.
In inflationary periods various groups are driven to devices such
as cost-of-living « escalator » clauses to protect themselves from the
rising cost of living. Unfortunately, however, resort to such devices may
further aggravate the situation.
While inflation and the rising cost of living explain much of the
unrest among workers today, it would be misleading to suggest that they
are the underlying problem. At worst they are symptoms or aggravating
factors, or both. In terms of underlying causes, they reflect the absence
of concensus on the distribution of the fruits of the économie system.
This lack of consensus, rather than inflation and the rising cost of living,
is surely a more fundamental cause of difficuky.
The So-called « Pearson Formula »
Adding fuel to the fire, at least until recently, was a séries of
government-sanctioned settlements in some widely publieized disputes,
including the Québec longshoremen and the seaway workers. Thèse
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settlements ranged as high as 30% spread over two or three years.
Although the seasonal nature of the work afforded a partial rationale for
the abnormally high levels of thèse settlements, the public at large was
left with the impression that expediency was the main criterion of
government intervention. This impression was aggravated by faulty
reporting in the mass média as to the exact nature of the settlements
that emerged. The essential point is that although government intervention may hâve been unavoidable, its results encouraged a wide
variety of groups to adopt extravagant bargaining demands in the hope
of similarly benefiting from benevolent government intervention.
Job Insecurity
Another cause of récent labour militancy has been warranted or
unwarrented concern us over job security. Publicly, the greatest amount
of concern has been expressed about outright displacement. Such fears
are bound to dominate the thinking of low seniority workers, particularly during an économie downturn. During the severe unemployment
of the late 50's, for example, workers became particularly concerned
about automation and other causes of displacement. Lacking bargaining power because of the économie downturn, unions then could
do relatively Iittle to protect their members. This left in its wake
concerns which continue to corne to the surface even after the problem
has lessened in significance.
Today fear of outright displacement is not necessarily the critical
issue. Often the more basic concern is the very thought of adjustment,
even when it is not likely to give rise to external displacement. Especially among older and less educated workers there is a marked inclination to favour the status quo. They hâve been repeatedly reminded
ci their disadvantages in an âge of rising skill requirements and they
readily support union demands for their protection.
Management

Secretiveness

Job insecurity breeds suspicion and makes workers susceptible to
rumours. An employées réputation for taking sudden unilatéral action
which affects his employées is bound to earn him ill will and generate
discontent. Intensified worker anxiety adds to the pressure upon unions
to win the job security safeguards they are demanding.
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The Rigidity of the Collective Agreement in
the Face of Changing Working Conditions
A collective agreement, in Canadian law, must be for a fixed period,
generally at least one year. During the currency of the agreement, its
terms and conditions can only be revised by consent of the parties.
However, while the threat of strike or lockout is a spur to negotiations
leading up to the création of a contract, no such threat can be made by
either party during discussions over its possible mid-term revision.
Strikes are outlawed for the duration of the agreement. Thus, it is
unlikely that an employer will consent to changes in the agreement,
even though requested changes might reflect the pressures of changing
working conditions in the plant.
One possible alternative would be for the parties to commit to an
impartial arbitrator the job of amending the agreement to ensure that
its terms are brought into line with changes which occur from time to
time in techhnology or corporate structure. However, agreements almost
never contain such a provision, and the law merely requires that the
arbitrator be empowered to deal with « the interprétation, application,
or alleged violation » of the agreement. Therefore, if a new process
is introduced into the plant, the union's only recourse is to demonstrate
that such action by management violâtes the terms of the agreement.
If a collective agreement merely provides that employées performing
certain duties are to be paid at a specified rate, then upon introduction
cf a change, which requires the performance of a new range of duties,
the company may unilaterally fix the new rates for those duties. Consequently, in such a situation, the union is powerless to stop a possible
érosion of its hard-won wage structure. Only if an arbitrator is prepared
to impose upon management an obligation to honour implied undertakings as well as the express language of the agreement can he give
the union a remedy.
Few Canadian arbitrators are prepared to adopt the widespread
American view that such implications can be made. No Canadian boards
hâve yet adopted even the minimal requirement that an employer
bargain with the union over the possible effects of technological change
in an effort to minimize worker dislocation. The majority view amongst
Canadian arbitrators is the « residual rights » theory, which reserves
to management ail of the rights it enjoyed before the advent of collective
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bargaining, except those which are specifically surrendered in the
express language of the collective agreement.
Whatever its merits, this doctrine has lessened the value of the
arbitration process as an administrative safety valve, and has reduced
organized labour's faith in it. We do not now propose to explore the
merits of the residual rights doctrine, as opposed to the alternative
suggested by Mr. Justice Freedman in his Inquiry into Run-throughs on
the Canadian National Railways. Suffice it to say that while the prevailing practice may seem to be sound conventional légal doctrine, and
to favour management, it may, for those very reasons, be an important
factor in aggravating worker restiveness.
When workers fear change, and find that their union is unable to
take effective steps to protect their position until the reopening of the
contract, they may become quite disillusioned. Frustrated, but not
powerless, they may be tempted to take matters into their own hands,
in défiance of both unions and employers. They may try to win by an
unlawful strike what they cannot achieve through légal remédies.
The Shifting Centres of Power in Union and

Management

The problems stemming from the shifting centres of power in union
and management can be examined at two levels. First there are difficulties resulting from centralized bargaining arrangements in which the
interests of local unions are submerged in some kind of Consolidated
negotiating procédure. Second, there are problems that can occur solely
vvithin large local unions as the administration of the collective agreement becomes more centralized. Less attention has been paid to the
latter than to the former problem and we will therefore begin with it.
There was a rime when organized labour wanted to commit the
collective agreement to writing and management was reluctant to do so.
However, as written agreements became commonplace, management
learned to live with them. Today the written agreement is managements Maginot Line, defended with vigour against a union adversary
whose tactic is to flow around the fixed positions of the written word,
and to draw strength from tacit understandings and customs.
This brings us to the source of the problem. As has been noted,
failing agreement on the meaning of the collective agreement, the

252

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, V O L . 23,

No.

2

parties are forced to resort to arbitration. Both sides hâve leamed that
arbitrators give a great deal of weight to past practice, at least in the
event of ambiguity in the language of the agreement. From management^ point of view, this means that if it wants to protect its interests,
it must insure that none of its supervisors are setting précédents which
could prove harmful in arbitration, To protect itself from union
attempts to establish such précédents, management has frequently been
driven to strip its first line supervisors of the power to make any significant contract interprétations lest they concède something they should
not. Under thèse circumstances, it does not take long for the union
steward (and ultimately the union members) involved to discover that
lower-level management lacks the power to settle their grievances. In
large organizations the delays which can resuit from more centralized
handling of such problems can easily lead to a frustrating accumulation
of unresolved issues. The conséquent tensions may cause the workers
affected to take matters into their own hands.
As noted at the beginning of this section, the same problem can
affect local unions as a unit when they are caught up in multi-plant or
multi-firm negotiations. Almost unavoidably there will be a tendency
for the bargaining représentatives to concentrate on common or unitwide problems, to the neglect of local issues. If this neglect persists,
local rebellions may be the resuit.
Long-term

Agreements

Further complicating the situation in many instances is the practice
of signing two, three, or even four years agreements. In ternis of stability
in the relationship between the parties, a strong case can be made for
lengthy agreements. The danger is that so many unforseen issues may
accumulate during the terms of thèse agreements that it will be very
difficult to satisfy the pent-up demands of the members in the next
round of negotiations. In effect, they will demand both catch-up concessions and guarantees against further frustration during the new
agreement, which may put unbearable pressures on both union and
management.
Inexpérience in Bargaining
In some situations, unrest is the product of inexpérience with collective bargaining. Newly-organized groups of workers may hâve
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nnrealistic expectations about the potential of concerted action to solve
their problems, producing an unhealthy combination of naivete and
strike-happiness. This appears to be particularly true of the professional and government employées who are just beginning to taste the
fruits of their combined économie power. Clearly the problem is further
compounded when their inexpérience is matched by a similar lack of
expérience on the other side of the bargaining table.
The Influx of Young People
Related to the previous point is the influence of the rising numbers
of young people entering the labour force. In contrast to earlier générations, thèse young people hâve born in a period of sustained prosperity,
are better educated, are more impatient for the good things of life, are
unintimidated by the expérience of the dépression, and are generally
more skeptical of the values of their elders and of the need to respect
authority. Unschooled in the traditions of trade unionism and collective
bargaining unappreciative, perhaps unaware, of their past accomplishments and eager to share in their purported benefits, their impact is
bound to be unsettling to say the least.
Factors Internai to the Labour Movement
In addition to the factors already cited, there are a number of
other forces at work that are largely internai to the labour movement.
One of the most critical of thèse is the problem of communications
within unions. Some of the larger labour organizations appear to be
having a great deal of difficulty in bridging the gap between the
leadership and the membership. This can become a particularly acute
problem where union leaders participate in summit meetings with their
opposite numbers from management. Occasionnally the resuit has been
a crisis of confidence which has jeopardized existing bargaining arrangements in some industries. This, in turn, has sometimes forced unions
and management to abandon their familiar and successful bargaining
habits in order to corne to grips with problems within the new politieal
framework.
Related to the communications problem is the increasing difficulty
which unions are having in reconciling the competing interests of their
members. In some unions this is exemplified by a widening conflict
of interest between skilled tradesmen and unskilled workers. In others
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it is manifested in a « conflict of générations», with younger workers
tending to want more in their weekly pay chèques, and older workers
favouring increased pension plans and other fringe benefits. Unions
hâve always had to engage in a great deal of « internai collective
bargaining » prior to and during their extemal collective bargaining
with management. If reconciliation of the competing interests within
the union is difficult, reconciliation with management becomes doubly
so.
Inter- and intra-union rivalry aggravâtes the situation in many cases.
Inter-union rivalry has been particularly severe in Québec, but it is also
évident that unions try to outdo each other, at least at the bargaining
table, in other parts of the country. Wage parity with the United States
has now become a focal point for this kind of inter-union compétition.
Perhaps more prévalent, particularly outside Québec, however, is intraunion factionalism. Although the left-wing faction is weaker in many
unions than it was in the past, there are still the « ins » and « outs »
vying for power particularly at the local union level.
Further aggravating the situation in many unions is the présence
of the so-called « young turks », some of whom are eager aspirants to
full-time union office. In the past when unions were growing more
rapidly, new talent could be absorbed into the hierarchy. Now there
are fewer openings and would-be leaders are driven to conclude that
the path upward leads over the bodies of the incumbents. There is also
the problem posed by younger members who do not take the union very
seriously and often look upon the possibility of a strike as something of
a lark. Both groups represent a difficult political challenge to established union officers, who are compelled to assume a posture of public
responsibility, while nurturing within the union an image of personal
militancy.
Lack of Satisfaction of Higher Order Needs
Earlier it was argued that the demand for a greater share of the
fruits of our économie System is a major cause of worker discontent.
At the same time it should be noted that material demands can become
secondary and be replaced in terms of primacy by certain higher order
needs. Given satisfaction of their basic physical needs, workers may
begin to désire such things as job satisfaction and self-respect. Where
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their work is inherently routine and monotonous, meeting thèse desires
may not be compatible with efficiency. For a time employers may be
able to buy off the resulting frustrations through higher wages and
fringe benefits, but at some point this may not suffice. Ultimately,
worker malaise may find expression in some act of wilful self-assertion,
such as deliberate absenteeism, insubordination, or wildcat strikes.
Rising Educational Levels
The average level of éducation in the labour force is steadily increasing. This could be having a number of effects on attitudes which
are relevant to the présent discussion. In the first place workers* expectations may be raised, both in a material sensé and in terms of the higher
order needs to which référence has just been made. Second, workers
may be more aware of the gênerai prosperity that surrounds them, of
the high profits of some of the firms for which they work, and of their
enhanced bargaining power in a period of prosperity. Third, increased
educational opportunities may divert the most intelligent and capable
members of the work force away from the factory into « white collar »
occupations, thus diluting the indigenous stock of potential leaders in
the plant. Where a génération ago union office might be one of the
few outlets for a bright youngster who was obliged to leave school
prematurely, and to go to work, today's educational opportunities equip
such persons for many other rôles.
Full Employment
The existence of full, even over-full, employment is not to be minimized in explaining the récent militancy of union members. When a
striking union has difficulty mustering members to man its picket lines
— as has happened in some récent cases — it is clear that the workers
hâve temporary employment elsewhere, and hâve nothing to lose and
everything to gain by « striking » against their regular employer. Union
leaders themselves hâve been embarrassed by the availability of alternative employment during a strike; on occasion, workers hâve refused
to accept an employées offer of a substantial increase because they
are under no real pressure to see the strike draw to a close.
The Fruits of Militancy
One of the most obvious reasons for continuing militancy among
union members is that it pays. In numerous récent cases, for example,
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workers hâve discovered that after they hâve turned down a company
offer, their leaders are able to extract further concessions. Haviing once
evperienced the success of this tactic, the temptation to use it regularly
is well-nigh irrésistible. As well, other workers are encouraged to
simulate intransigence in the hope of extracting more enticing offers
from their employer.
The Rôle of

Management

It would be easy to enumerate various management practices which
contribute to worker discontent and to stress the need for improvement
in thèse practices. Already mentioned, for example, has been the adverse
effect which managements failure to give advance warning about
planned changes can hâve on workers' attitudes. Without minimizing
the importance of improving managerial techniques, it would seem
more useful to emphasize how management is unwittingly but clearly
playing into the hands of the more militant éléments within the ranks
of union members.
In the last section it was noted that one of the factors which helps
to explain continued rank and file union militancy is the fact that it is
yielding results. This is true in many instances because management
is buckling under pressure, instead of standing firm. Sometimes this is
due to the seeming inability of firms in the same industry to band
together for collective bargaining purposes. Sometimes it is due to the
compétitive position of a single firm. In virtually ail cases, managements lack of résolve appears to reflect a decidely short-run view of
the stakes involved.
In ternis of expediency, it is quite understandable that management
should often attempt to buy peace, especially when rank and file militancy is channelled through formai union action. However, this policy
of appeasement is dangerous when worker resentment is being directed
as much against the union as against management. Not surprisingly,
in this kind of situation, union officiais would often like to see management stand firm. Where rank and file members are defying their leaders
and management capitulâtes in the face of their pressure, the union and
its leadership can be so undermined as to completely upset the labourmanagement relationship. Moreover, management behaviour of this
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kind — regardless of its motivation — clearly invites a répétition of
membership défiance in the future.
Other causes could doubtless be added to the catalogue of factors
we hâve cited in our attempt to explain the increased militancy of rank
and file union members. One possible addition which cornes readily
to mind, for example, is the effect which outside criticisms of the labour
movement could be having on its membership. Conceivably such
criticism, especially when directed at alleged lack of union effectiveness,
might induce union members to demand more of their leaders. However,
this and other potential causes of rank and file restiveness do not in
our opinion approach in gênerai significance the sixteen factors we
hâve examined.
EXPLAINING INCREASED LABOUR DÉFIANCE OF THE L A W

We turn next to a question, the answers to which involve examination of societal values of the highest importance. Why is it that union
militancy has not been expressed through lawful processes which are
available to employées to redress their grievances and to advance or
protect their économie position ?
Labour lawlessness must, first, be placed in context. A distinguished
jurist, J.C. McRuer, formerly Chief Justice of the High Court of Ontario,
has said recently:
I challenge the premise that the ordinary man on the street has less
respect for justice today than he had fifty years ago. Our forefathers
too often believed in vigourously defending laws and a social order
that had one quality of justice for the powerful and another quality
of justice for the weak... I am prepared to admit that there is a
declining respect for many laws. I am not prepared to admit there is
a declining respect for law. If there is a declining respect for law,
legislators, lawyers and judges hâve failed to develop just laws and
just procédures appropriate to the social changes brought about by
the scientific developments of this century...

In the view of a man who has lived his life in the law, it is a passion
for justice which has, in a broad sensé, often led to disrespect for laws.
This passion, in its most éloquent form, is exemplified by the campaign
of civil disobedience waged by those who are protesting against racial
injustice and what they conceive to be an immoral foreign policy. The
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civil rights movement made « lawlessness » a badge of honour, worn
with pride by those who vvere prepared to face fines and imprisonment
rather than to abide injustice.
The new respectability of lawlessness, however, is premised upon
a belief that the légal order is not a just order. Whether this is a simplistic view of Canadian labour relations law is a matter for debate.
But the real facts of the matter are less relevant in terms of explaining
labour lawlessness than the widespread conviction of unionists that they
hâve little to gain and much to lose if they comply with the law.
To the extent that genuine grievances do exist, thèse must be
recognized if labour is to be persuaded to change its view. Perhaps
the least controversial of thèse complaints relates to the problem of
delay. While delays are found in many areas throughout our légal
system, the fast-moving nature of industrial relations makes expeditious
handling of labour problems particularly urgent. Expérience appears
to be least satisfactory in conciliation and arbitration.
Many criticisms hâve also been made of our contemporary techniques of regulating picketing. Quite apart from the merits of particular
cases, the statistical fact that the great majority of injunctions sought
are actually granted, in and of itself raises a presumption of unfairness
in the minds of unionists. To non-labour critics of the labour injunction,
procédural abuses at least seem to call for substantial reforrns. The
appearance of fairness is dissipated — to some extent unavoidably so
— by the short notice required to be given prior to a hearing, the
practical impossibility of making full answer and defence, the peremptory nature of the hearings, and the virtual unavailability of appeal.
Equally perplexing to the uncommitted observer, is the apparent manipulation of jurisprudential concepts and disregard of traditional strictures on the use of the court's injunctive power.
On the crédit side, for those concerned with the fairness of the
courts, is the récent démise of the ex parte injunction and signs of a
trend towards more overt reliance by judges upon législative policies
as the basis for their décisions.
However the débits and the crédits may balance out, the most
unfortunate development is that the confidence of labour in the fairness
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of the judiciary lias been seriously undermined. ït bas been undermined
scmetimes by the cynical and suggestive remarks of eritics and sometimes
by self-incriminating judicial utterances. Consider, for example, such
exceptional but gratuitous statements as:
Therefore, the right, if there be such a right, of the (union) to
engage in secondary pickting of the . . . premises must give way to
the . . . right to trade ; the former, assuming it to be a légal right,
is exercised for the benefit if a particular class only while the latter
is a right far more fundamental and of far greater importance, in my
view, as cne which in its exercise affects and is for the benefit of
the community at large.

or, again:
In discussing the conduct of union members it may not be amiss to
recognize that a high percentage of unions are dominated by persons
from another State whose basic concept of law, order, good conduct
and labour relations are not necessarily ours, but whose control seems
almost to be absolute.

Beyond thèse infrequent fut blatant examples of judicial antipathy
towards labour, there is the subtler, yet more important, fact that légal
doctrines developed and administered by courts are often rigid and
unresponsive to the needs and problems of a collective bargaining
régime. For example, the abiliry of an employer, under présent Canadian law, to undermine the structure of a collective bargaining relationship by the institution of technological change, or by relocation of the
plant, lias shaken the confidence of unions in the law's evenhandedness.
Even when the substance of the law clearly favours the position of the
union, as for example in imposing a duty of good faith bargaining upon
the employer, practical difficulties of enforcement sometimes seem to
render the law a hollow mockery.
The problems of enforcing the law produce a final explanation of
why labour has turned to lawless techniques of satisfying its restless
urges. Having lost confidence in the law, labour lias ceased to comply
with it voluntarily. This raises the problem of how compliance can be
enforced. Certainly, in the présent state of the law, it is difficult for
an employer to secure monetary compensation through the regular courts
for wrongs done by the union, although arbitration boards hâve on a
number of occasions awarded employers damages because of union
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îiability for unlawful strikes. The criminal process is slow, proof is
difficult, and police and prosecuting authorities are reluctant to intervene on behalf of either party to a labour dispute. Consequently, since
be can neither prosecute nor sue for damages, the employer is driven
to use the injunction as the primary technique of protecting his légal
position.
Of course, an injunction is not seîf-executing; it is merely a cornmand whose efficacy dépends on the willingness of those to whom it is
addressed to obey it willingly, or on the ability of those who make the
command to enforce it. Until recently, the mère issuance of the
injunction was sufficient to secure an end to picketing presumably
because unionists were then no more prepared to abandon respect for
the law than most citizens. However, as this respect has waned, with
decreasing confidence in the basic fairness of the courts, deliberate
disobedience of the injunction has become more prévalent. Although
those who disobey an injunction are liable to fine and imprisonment for
contempt of court, it seems unlikely that such sanctions can be completely effective. First, there is the practical problem of enforcement:
large numbers of contemnors must be identified and brought to court,
spécifie allégations must be made and proved against each, jails must be
found to accommodate those found guilty, or extended proceedings
taken to recover unpaid fines. The second problem is even greater:
for a unionist who deliberately courts martyrdom, fines and jail are
not a form of punishment but rather the veiy thing he seeks. If the
situation détériorâtes sufficiently a government may feel itself confronted
by a dilemma from which it can only escape by reform of the law:
vigorous enforcement of injunctions may produce a backlash at the
poils; non-enforcernent may undermine the credibility of the whole
judicila process. To avoid this dilemma, the Government of Ontario
has appointed a Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes.
Whether its report will ultimately stimulate effective reform of the law
remains to be seen.
Summory and Conclusions

The few insights planted throughout this paper are obviously inadéquate to produce a bountiful crop of solutions. Indeed if we were
to suggest plausible solutions we woulcl be preempting the function of
a swarm of task forces, labour-management committees and royal commissions. Instead, we will conclude by reviewing our major thesis, and
by speculating about some of its implications.
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We hâve tried to describe the nature of récent industrial unrest in
Canada, with particular référence to two of its most disturbing features,
rank and file militancy and labour défiance of the law. In each case,
we hâve identified a variety of causes, but we wish to reiterate that,
in a given situation, thèse causes may be présent in varying degrees.
We hâve therefore studiously avoided any suggestion that there is a
monolithic explanation for thèse phenomena.
Before concluding, however, we would like to pass beyond this
disclaimer in order to make several more pointed observations. To
begin with we should make it clear that to a degree we welcome the
militancy recently displayed by rank and file union members. While
this militancy obviously has its irresponsible and disturbing aspects, it
can be viewed in a positive light as well. At least we hâve been reassured that union members are still determined to govern their own
affairs. From rime to time, they may hâve to reclaim the « collective »
bargaining system as their own, if it is not to become the property of
a labour bureaucracy. Although this self-assertion by the rank and file
may produce more militancy and conflict than we are accustomed to,
it is a price we must pay for the contribution which collective bargaining makes both to the maintenance of our free enterprise system on the
économie side, and to our démocratie system on the political side.
The basic challenge in the long run is for unions to remain at one
and the same time both démocratie — in the sensé of being responsive
to the wishes of their members — and responsible — in the sensé of
being able to commit themselves contractually and otherwise to employer and to society at large. Over the décades unions hâve done a
commendable job of reconciling the vaiious obligations which thèse
twin pressures impose upon them. From time to time, however, undue
déférence may seem to be paid to one of thèse duties rather than to the
other. It is at times such as this that we need to retain perspective.
The seductive appeal of législation is almost irrésistible but, to the extent
possible, dalliance should précède consummation. There is a real risk
that a crisis stature will compound our problems rather than résolve
them.
In conclusion, we would make one final point. As never before
unions and their leaders are functioning as managers of discontent.
Their constraints are more rigid and inflexible, their mandate more
tenuous, than is gênerally appreciated. They need a reasonable freedom
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from external pressure if they are not to become entirely the mère messengers of the discontented. Thus, if union leaders are to do what is
vesponsible in the long run, they may hâve to do what seems îxresponsible in the short run, or the membership will dépose them. If this
seems to be a choice of evils, we would only add that with collective
bargaining, as with many démocratie institutions, a perverse faith in the
rJtimate capabilities of men may be our only hope — that, and the
absence of an acceptable alternative.

LE MALAISE INDUSTRIEL AU CANADA: UN DIAGNOSTIC
DE LA RÉCENTE EXPÉRIENCE
U N E PERSPECTIVE DU MALAISE INDUSTRIEL AU CANADA

Nous pouvons croire au premier abord que le Canada, comme les autres
sociétés industrielles libres, a subi la plupart des grandes manifestations du malaise
industriel durant les années de croissance économique. Avant de vérifier la vérité
de cette croyance, nous nous pencherons sur les deux caractéristiques de la présente vague de malaise qui semble avoir des causas très complexes :
1.—le militantisme spontané des ouvriers du rang ;
2.—le mépris accru de la loi de la part des syndicats.
Mais nous pourrions peut-être dire que ces deux traits sont la rançon de la
prospérité.

L E SYNDICALISME, LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE,
LE DROIT ET LES AVOCATS DU TRAVAIL

Le syndicalisme est sans contredit une partie essentielle de l'organisation industrielle d'une société libre. C'est en fait un participant indispensable au processus
de la négociation collective. Cependant on ne considère trop souvent que le rôle
proprement économique du syndicat, alors que sa plus grande contribution peut
aussi bien être dans d'autres domaines.
Si nous considérons le point de vue légal, nous devons noter que le rôle du
droit en relations industrielles n'est ni statique ni inévitable. Nos lois du travail
soutiennent ce désir que la négociation collective soit une technique pour régulariser les relations industrielles en tentant de balancer le pouvoir entre les deux
parties à la négociation. Mais alors que les lois du travail reflètent une pensée
contemporaine, la jurisprudence représente un consensus social plus vieux basé
sur des divergences de vues au sujet des politiques publiques et des propriétés
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de la négociation collective. Les politiques plus vieilles penchent vers la protection
des entrepreneurs contre l'interférence syndicale alors que la législation contemporaine prone la protection de la négociation collective contre l'hostilité des employeurs.
Tout ceci nous amène à faire quelques remarques sur le rôle de l'avocat en
relations industrielles. Même si l'esprit parfois trop juridique des avocats a contribué à empoisonner les relations de travail, ils peuvent, et le font de plus en
plus, apporter une contribution à la fois constructive et créative.
L E S CARACTERISTIQUES DE LA RECENTE VAGUE
DE M ALAISE INDUSTRIEL

Pour mieux analyser la récente vague de malaise industriel au Canada, nous
devons d'abord identifier plus à fond ses caractéristiques. En plus des deux traits
généraux déjà mentionnés, il y en a au moins six autres spécifiques à considérer :
1.—le haut taux de roulement des vieux chefs syndicaux ;
2.—le refus des membres de ratifier les conventions collectives ;
3.—les grèves sauvages ;
4.—les rivalités inter-syndicales ;
5.—la syndicalisation de nouveaux secteurs de l'économie ;
6.—le temps perdu dû aux grèves.
ANALYSE DE LA PRÉSENTE VAGUE DE MALAISE INDUSTRIEL

Dans les lignes qui suivent, nous porterons d'abord notre attention sur les
causes du militantisme ouvrier pour ensuite considérer les raisons du mépris qu'ont
les syndicats de l'ordre et de la loi.
a)

Explication de militantisme des ouvriers du rang
1.—la tendance à toujours demander plus dans notre société d'abondance;
2.—l'inflation et l'élévation du coût de la vie ;
3.—la soi-disant formule Pearson ;
4.—l'insécurité d'emploi ;
5.—le caractère cachotier du patronat ;
6.—la rigidité de la convention collective face aux changements dans les
conditions de travail ;
7.—le changement des centres de pouvoir syndicaux et patronaux ;
8.—les accords à long terme ;
9.—le manque d'expérience en négociation collective ;
10.—la croissance du nombre des jeunes membres ;
11.—les facteurs internes au mouvement ouvrier ;
12.—le manque de satisfaction des besoins supérieurs ;
13.—l'élévation du niveau d'éducation ;
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14.—le plein emploi ;
15.—les fruits du militantisme ;
16.—le rôle de la direction.
b)

Explication du mépris accru des syndicats face à la loi

Ce mépris de la loi doit être placé dans son contexte. Les syndicalistes ont
la fenne conviction qu'ils ont peu à gagner et beaucoup à perdre en se soumettant
à la loi. Il en serait ainsi dans le cas des délais, piquetages et des injonctions.
Mais il reste que les doctrines développées et administrées par les cours de
justice sont souvent rigides et ne répondent pas aux besoins et aux problèmes du
régime de négociation collective. Ayant donc perdu confiance dans la loi., les syndicats ont cessé de s'y soumettre. Ceci soulève une question à savoir comment
peut-on retrouver la soumission d'antan ? Soit en appliquant la loi à la lettre ou,
si cela s'avère inutile, la changer tout simplement.

CONCLUSION

Nous ne prétendons pas avoir apporté une foule de solutions aux problèmes
existants. Nous avons seulement tenté de décrire la nature du récent malaise
industriel au Canada. Le défi de longue période pour les syndicats serait alors de
demeurer à la fois démocratique et responsable.
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